Wittgenstein and Religious Belief

About this video

David Ellis explains Wittgenstein’s later view of religious belief, arguing that religious statements like “God exists” should not be treated as ordinary factual claims. Wittgenstein rejects the idea that religious belief is based on evidence or functions like scientific belief. Instead, he sees religion as a distinctive “language game” embedded in a particular form of life, where meaning arises from use rather than truth‑conditions. Religious belief is not an opinion open to doubt or proof, but an “unshakeable” commitment that shapes how a person lives, thinks, and acts. Understanding religion therefore requires viewing it from within its lived practices, not judging it by external standards of evidence.

Background

Produced in March 2026. Provisional captions. The sound volume drops at various points in the video as there was a problem with the microphone, so we apologise if this affects your enjoyment of the talk.

The video has been divided into chapters as follows:

Chapter 1. The Problem of Religious Belief (0:00 –6:30)

What does it mean to say “God exists”?

• Ordinary belief vs religious belief
• Wittgenstein’s challenge to evidence‑based interpretations
• Introduction to his later philosophy and why religion is controversial

Chapter 2. Language Games, Meaning, and Forms of Life (6:30 – 14:30)

How language actually works

• Meaning as use, not reference
• Language games and rules
• Form of life and context
• Why “God exists” cannot be treated like “the Earth exists”

Chapter 3. Grammar, Belief, and Evidence (14:30 – ~24:00)

Why religious belief is not evidence‑based

• Surface grammar vs depth grammar
• Why religious belief is not an opinion
• The “Last Judgment” example
• Belief as life‑regulating, not evidential

Chapter 4. Consequences and Evaluation (24:00 – 32:40)

Why Wittgenstein’s view is radical and controversial

• Unshakeable belief vs ordinary belief
• Criticisms of Wittgenstein’s approach
• What it means to understand religion “from the inside”
• Why the view is still philosophically valuable